MILF PEACE PACT:
WHAT IF….?
Volume XVII NO 27 (April 26 to May 2, 2014)
(The author was formerly GRP Peace Panel Chairman, Presidential Peace Adviser and Presidential Adviser for Mindanao under former Presidents Ramos and Arroyo.)
There are many questions that since have arisen after the signing of the comprehensive agreement for the Bangsamoro (CAB). Most of them are questions projecting worse case scenarios. Or are just plain and simple apprehensions of people who want to see the CAB succeed. It may be helpful if we confront those questions this early so we know how to deal with them when the time comes. Here are some “what if” scenarios ( I refer to them as obstacles that we must hurdle ) and some practical recommendations to deal with them. I do not wish to appear presumptuous. These are my own preliminary thoughts and given for whatever they may be worth. Some, I admit, may be misplaced. I am sure there are many out there who can further enhance or suggest more scenarios.
I am listing those “obstacles” with some personal recommendations on how to “hurdle” them.
A) CONGRESSIONAL — What if Congress will not approve “ en toto” ( in its entirety) the agreement that was a product of long and tedious negotiations between the government and the MILF that spanned about 17 years?
What if Congress writes its own version of a peace deal and will change, alter or vary substantive provisions of the CAB in the proposed basic law — as what Congress earlier did in the laws that implemented the MNLF Tripoli peace agreement of 1976 and the final peace agreement of 1996 which MNLF’s Nur Misuari denounced?
What if the MILF will not agree to the changes or alterations or enhancements that Congress will unilaterally approve — given that the tedious negotiations crafted precise language and provisos that were mutually acceptable taking into account their respective negotiable and non- negotiable positions?
Recommendation: DURING CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS, THE MILF MUST BE INVOLVED SOMEHOW SO THAT THE FINAL APPROVED VERSION WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. SOME SORT OF A “NEGOTIATIONS TABLE” BE OPENED BY CONGRESS TO CONTINUE ENGAGING WITH THE MILF DURING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO ASSURE THAT THE MILF WILL NOT “WALK AWAY” OR REJECT IT WHEN THE LAW IS PASSED. MILF MUST ALSO TELEGRAPH SOMEHOW TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE BANGSAMORO, THAT THE CAB IS “INCLUSIVE” AND NOT INTENDED TO DISLODGE THEM POLITICALLY OR FOR THE MILF TO ENTRENCH ITSELF AT THEIR EXPENSE.
B) CONSTITUTIONAL — What if legal action is filed in the Supreme Court questioning the CAB — with initial noises about constitutional issues now being raised?
What if the case drags or its resolution delayed in the Supreme Court — knowing how long cases are resolved?
What if the Supreme Court declaresÿ partly or whollyÿ the CAB or the organic law as unconstitutional — as what happened in the MOA-AD in 2008?
Recommendation: KNOWING MILF’S PRINCIPLED STAND OF NON-ADHERENCE TO THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL PROCESSES AND THEREFORE ITS EXPECTED NON-INVOLVEMENT IN ANY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, IT MAY BE BEST NONETHELESS THAT IN THE SUPREME COURT CASE, THE MILF MUST BE IMPLEADED AS AN AFFECTED/INTERESTED/ADVERSE PARTY OR AT THE LEAST, ITS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES INVITED IN THE LEGAL PANEL OF THE GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT THE CAB, SO THAT IT WILL BE DULY INFORMED OF THE ISSUES AND UNDERSTAND FULLY THE FINAL RULING WHEN IT COMES. IT WILL ALSO SIGNAL MILF’S TRANSITION INTO EVENTUALLY RECOGNIZING CONSTITUTIONAL PRIMACY WHICH IS THE END GAME OF THE PEACE ACCORD.
c) POLITICAL — What if in the plebiscite, the incumbent political leaders who have the command votes and who will feel threatened to be sidelined by the new Bangsamoro regime will campaign against it — given that political leaders and their supporters in offices in the ARMM are more politically savvy and entrenched?
What if in the plebisciteÿ it will not be approved by the citizens ?
What if after a vote in the plebisciteÿ the Bangsamoro territory that votes “yes” will only cover a smaller area that will render it not viable as a governance unit as envisioned — given that some areas now within the ARMM even prefer to get out of the ARMM?
What if in the 2016 electionsÿ the MILF candidates will not win in the elections — being now still in the process of organizing itself into a political party and is expected to compete with well-financed and more experienced non-MILF political players in the field?
What if the MILF aligns and fields its own candidates with a political party in the 2016 elections — given that the issues on Bangsamoro aspiration ought to stay above the divisive political fray?
Recommendations: THE MILF MUST MODERATE OR CALIBRATE ITS POLITICAL PLANS. TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL LEADERS AND MAINSTREAM CONSTITUENCIES AND EVENTUALLY WIN THE VOTES IN THE PLEBISCITE AND THE ELECTIONS, THE MILF MUST INITIALLY FOCUS ON THE REGIONAL OR THE BANGSAMORO GOVERNANCE ENTITY AND LEAVE THE LGUs TO MAINSTREAM POLITICAL LEADERS TO SHOW “INCLUSIVENESS” AND OF COURSE GET THEIR SUPPORT. MOST IMPORTANT IS FOR PRESIDENT AQUINO TO INVEST POLITICAL GOODWILL AND CAPITAL TO SEE TO IT THAT THE MILF “TAKES OVER” THE GOVERNANCE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEW BANGSAMORO ENTITY, AT LEAST IN THE REGIONAL LEVEL.
D) INTERNAL — What if the MILF cannot exercise effective command and control of its forces who are “gung ho” in dominating the areas anticipating a full “takeover” of the Bangsamoro areas — given the experience in the failed MOA-AD when aggressive MILF elements forcefully dislodged occupants of their claimed ancestral domain lands in anticipation of the MOA-AD implementation?
What if certain MILF commanders start enforcing their own Islamic rules and laws effectively and prematurely challenging regular law enforcement agencies in some Bangsamoro areas and hence contributing to more alienation and lose of support of the masses?
What if due to expected delays in implementation timelines, some MILF elements take unilateral forceful action to express dissatisfaction or impatience that will be disruptive of the process?
What if the MILF leadership cannot address the growing internal bickering or competition that are always normal in empowered or enhanced opportunities that may not be equitably available for all MILF?
Recommendations: THE MILF HEADED BY KAGI MURAD MUST EXERCISE FIRM LEADERSHIP AND CONTROL AND BE THE MODERATING FORCE TO PRESERVE THE GAINS OF THE PEACE EFFORTS.
E) TRANSITIONAL — What if the MILF will not be able to meet the high expectations of the Bangsamoro during the short transition period or beyond — most MILF elements now still adjusting and needing longer time for capacitation and preparation for governance?
What if there are not enough resources and development support to quickly bring results — there being now very high expectations amongst the Bangsamoro for the dividends of peace to improve their live?
Recommendations: WITH THE MILF ‘TAKING OVER’ THE ARMM GOVERNANCE LEVEL IN 2016, IT MUST SHOW ITS CAPABILITY AND SINCERETY IN IMPROVING THE LIVES OF THE BANGSAMORO. TO ASSURE INITIAL OR START UP BUDGETARY SUPPORT, CONGRESS BEFORE IT VOWS OUT IN 2016 MUST PASS ANNUAL BUDGETS WITH CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS TO SUPPORT ON A LONG TERM THE NEW BANGSAMORO ENTITY (SOME SORT OF A “ MINI MARSHAL PLAN”). INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITIES, WHILE THE PEACE EUPHORIAIS STILL STRONG AND BEFORE DONOR FATIGUE SETS IN, MUST BE CONVENED TO DO A PLEDGING SESSION TO COMMIT SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING FUND SUPPORT ON LONG TERM.
F) SECURITY —What if the MILF, in the decommissioning phase, will not declare its actual strength?
What if , as envisioned in the decommissioning stage, the former identified MILF camps cannot be restored or returned — given that IPs or non-MILF elements now claim they were the original occupants and rightful owners thereof?
What if the MILF , being not disarmed and still with their firearms, will use threats and violence to win the plebiscite and win the votes in the regular elections?
What if the MILF eventually decides not to disarm at all — the phased disarmament being dependent on how the implementation of the CAB is achieved or that their disarmament is dependent on whether other armed groups are also effectively disarmed?
What if armed non-MILF elements will continue to disrupt, making MILF unable to bring peace to the Bangsamoro area — with so many other armed groups operating and the proliferation of firearms?
What if Islamic extremists or fundamentalists and others continue their aspiration for Islamic independence and continue their armed struggle?
My recommendation:
THE AFP AND THE PNP MUST PREPARE FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO AND CRAFT OPTIONS AND NOT BE LULLED BY THE “PROSPECTS OF PEACE”. MOREOVER, THE MILF IS ONLY ONE OF THE MANY SECURITY THREATS THE NATION FACES. (SORRY, I HAVE NO SUFFICIENT STRATEGIC, TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE TO GIVE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS.)
G) INCLUSIVITY — What if some MNLF and Misuari groups still feel sidelined and will disrupt or undermine the MILF peace efforts?
What if the BIFF of Umbra Kato (now under Commander Karyalan) and other so-called MILF rogue armed elements will continue to operate?
What if there are peace-loving Muslims who do not believe in the MILF as truly representing their aspirations as a people?
What if other Muslims feel lack of ownership in the CAB, the proposed basic law and other outcomes of the peace agreement?
Recommendation: THE MILF MUST NOT ASSUME THAT THEY REPRESENT THE WHOLE BANGSAMORO. IT MUST “WIN” THE SUPPORT OF AS MANY BY THE MANNER THEY WILL PERFORM.
WHILE SEVERAL NGOs ARE HELPING, MORE INVOLVEMENT OF OTHERS MUST BE DONE IN THE NEXT STEPS IN CONGRESS IN THE CRAFTING OF THE BASIC LAW THROUGH EXTENSIVE PUBLIC HEARINGS NOT ONLY IN MANILA BUT ON THE GROUND IN THE FIELD TO WIN WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AND OWNERSHIP
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H) BEYOND 2016 — What if due to the delay in Congress or in the Supreme Court, the timetable will not be met and the next Philippine president makes the judgment call?
What if MILF politically aligns with the administration party and the opposition wins?
What if the successor of President Aquino in 2016 will not be as supportive to the CAB ?
Recommendations: DURING THE 2016 ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN, ALL CANDIDATES OR THOSE RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE IN THE NATIONAL AND CONCERNED AREAS IN THE LOCAL LEVEL MUST BE MADE TO COMMIT TO A PEACE AGENDA AND SIGN A “COVENANT FOR PEACE” WHICH WILL AT LEAST GUARANTEE CONTINUING SUPPORT TO THE PEACE PROCESS BEYOND 2016, WHOEVER WINS. THE MILF MUST DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO ALIGN WITH THE ADMINISTRATION PARTY. IF IT DOES, TO PERHAPS INSURE VICTORY IN 2016, IT MUST REACH OUT TO ALL OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES FOR SUPPORT AKIN TO A COMMON CANDIDATE SCENARIO. IT HAS TO MAKE A CRUCIAL DECISION ON WHETHER IT IS BEST TO OPENLY SUPPORT A PARTICULAR CANDIDATE OR NOT SO IT DOES NOT PUT IN JEOPARDY THE FUTURE OF THE BANGSAMORO ENTITY AND DEPENDENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS IN 2016. ALTHOUGH IT IS PREPARING TO BE A POLITICAL PARTY, IT MUST AT THIS EARLY STAGE TRY TO REMAIN “APOLITICAL” AS MUCH AS IT CAN TO INSURE WIDE AND SUSTAINABLE SUPPORT TO SURVIVE. TRUTH TO TELL, THE MILF WILL STILL BE A NEOPHYTE BY 2016 TO ENGAGE IN THE ROUGH AND TUMBLE OF REAL POLITIK. A FINAL SHOT: MILF MUST GET SAVVY POLITICAL ADVISERS THIS EARLY.
LAST CHANCE —I’ll stop here for the meantime. I am sure there are still many “what if” situations outside of what I have preliminarily mentioned. But let’s all keep in mind those “HURDLES” so we all help in seeing to it that the CAB succeeds as envisioned.
This is our last chance, folks, for a peaceful settlement. If we mess this one up, we may never get the same opportunity again. Mark my word!/ADVOCACY MINDANoW FOUNDATION, INC. (AMFI)/Follow us at Twitter: AMFI_Mindanow/Email us: info@advocacymindanow.org/Visit us: www.advocacymindanow.orgv
